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Security

Security Model​

loki-vl-proxy is intentionally read-focused. The default posture is:

  • read APIs enabled for Loki-compatible querying
  • write ingestion API (/loki/api/v1/push) blocked (405)
  • admin/debug APIs disabled unless explicitly enabled

The only write-path exception is /loki/api/v1/delete, gated by strict safeguards.

High-Impact Controls​

1) Tenant Isolation​

  • X-Scope-OrgID is mapped to VictoriaLogs tenant IDs via -tenant-map
  • optional multi-tenant fanout is explicit (tenant-a|tenant-b)
  • wildcard tenant mode (*) is proxy-specific and requires explicit allow config

2) /tail Browser-Origin Controls​

  • /loki/api/v1/tail can enforce allowed browser origins
  • use -tail.allowed-origins for Grafana/browser clients
  • keep restrictive defaults for internet-exposed deployments

3) Delete Safeguards​

/loki/api/v1/delete requires:

  • X-Delete-Confirmation: true
  • explicit query selector (no broad wildcard delete)
  • explicit start and end time bounds
  • tenant-scoped execution and audit logging

4) Request Hardening​

  • max request body/header limits
  • request timeout boundaries
  • built-in rate limiting and global concurrency guards
  • request coalescing + circuit breaker to reduce backend cascade risk

5) Transport Security​

  • frontend TLS and optional mTLS support
  • backend TLS controls for VictoriaLogs/OTLP exporters
  • controlled forwarding of auth headers/cookies to backend
  • optional peer-cache shared-token protection via -peer-auth-token

CI Security Lanes​

The repository now treats security validation as its own layered test surface instead of burying it inside generic CI.

Fast PR Blockers​

Defined in .github/workflows/security-pr.yaml.

  • gitleaks for secret detection in the repository
  • gosec for Go-focused SAST on the proxy and related packages
  • Trivy filesystem scanning for vulnerabilities, misconfigurations, and secrets
  • actionlint for GitHub Actions workflow validation
  • hadolint for Dockerfile hygiene and hardening
  • OpenSSF Scorecard for repository and supply-chain posture

This lane is supposed to fail quickly on issues that should never merge.

Runtime PR Security​

Also defined in .github/workflows/security-pr.yaml.

  • custom Go security regressions from scripts/ci/run_security_regressions.sh
  • OWASP ZAP baseline scan from scripts/ci/run_zap_scan.sh baseline

This lane validates the running stack rather than just the source tree. It is intentionally pointed at a short allowlist in security/zap/targets.txt so the baseline scan exercises the real user and admin/debug surface without wandering into unrelated compose internals.

Heavy Scheduled Security​

Defined in .github/workflows/security-heavy.yaml.

  • Trivy image scan against the built runtime image
  • SBOM generation for downstream review and artifact retention
  • longer fuzz runs
  • broader Semgrep coverage
  • OWASP ZAP active scan
  • curated Nuclei templates from security/nuclei/

This lane is intentionally heavier and is meant for scheduled or manual deep validation rather than fast PR feedback.

Repository-Specific Threat Model​

Generic scanners are useful here, but the highest-risk bugs for this project are still proxy-specific:

  • tenant isolation around X-Scope-OrgID and any tenant-derived cache keys
  • cache isolation across memory, disk, and peer cache layers
  • metadata, label, and field enumeration leaks between tenants
  • auth-boundary confusion across downstream requests, upstream requests, and forwarded headers/cookies
  • /tail browser-origin enforcement and websocket handling
  • oversized bodies, oversized headers, huge query windows, and malformed LogQL payloads
  • debug/admin exposure on non-loopback listeners

The custom regression suite is biased toward these risks rather than only generic scanner output.

Response-Header Baseline​

The proxy now applies the same baseline security response headers across normal routes, 404s, and disabled admin/debug endpoints:

  • X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
  • X-Frame-Options: DENY
  • Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy: same-origin
  • Cache-Control: no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate, max-age=0
  • Pragma: no-cache
  • Expires: 0

That removes the weaker edge-path behavior where scanners could still reach missing or disabled routes without the same browser and cache protections as the main API surface.

Container And Chart Posture​

  • the runtime image now runs as a non-root user
  • the runtime image keeps a read-only root filesystem
  • Helm drops all capabilities and blocks privilege escalation
  • the chart can optionally mount host /proc read-only for richer process/system metrics

The host /proc mount is intentional. Trivy would normally flag this, so CI uses a narrow .trivyignore.yaml exception for the specific chart template path rather than disabling the broader class of checks.

Admin and Debug Endpoints​

The following are disabled by default and should stay restricted:

  • /debug/queries
  • /debug/pprof/*

Enable only for controlled troubleshooting windows. On non-loopback listen addresses the proxy now refuses to start with these enabled unless -server.admin-auth-token is set.

/metrics stays available on the main listener when instrumentation is enabled, but the default export now suppresses per-tenant and per-client identity labels. Opt back in with -metrics.export-sensitive-labels=true only on trusted scrape paths.

  • explicit -tenant-map (avoid implicit defaults for multi-tenant production)
  • keep -tenant.allow-global=false unless you intentionally need wildcard backend-default access
  • strict /tail origin allowlist
  • conservative request-size and timeout limits
  • explicit -http-read-header-timeout and bounded /metrics concurrency
  • ServiceMonitor + alerting on 5xx, circuit breaker open state, and backend latency
  • -server.admin-auth-token for debug/admin surfaces
  • -peer-auth-token when peer cache crosses network trust boundaries
  • avoid exposing debug/admin endpoints publicly

Local Security Validation​

Useful local commands while working on hardening or CI changes:

# repo secret scan
docker run --rm -v "$PWD:/repo" -w /repo \
  ghcr.io/gitleaks/gitleaks:v8.28.0 \
  detect --source . --report-format sarif --report-path gitleaks.sarif --exit-code 1

# Go SAST
go install github.com/securego/gosec/v2/cmd/gosec@v2.22.7
"$(go env GOPATH)/bin/gosec" \
  -exclude=G104,G108,G115,G301,G302,G304,G306,G402,G404 \
  -exclude-generated \
  ./...

# filesystem scan with the same allowlist CI uses
docker run --rm -v "$PWD:/repo" -w /repo \
  aquasec/trivy:0.69.3 \
  fs . \
  --ignorefile .trivyignore.yaml \
  --scanners vuln,misconfig,secret \
  --severity HIGH,CRITICAL \
  --ignore-unfixed \
  --exit-code 1 \
  --skip-version-check

# workflow and Dockerfile linting
docker run --rm -v "$PWD:/repo" -w /repo rhysd/actionlint:1.7.7 -color
docker run --rm -i -v "$PWD/.hadolint.yaml:/root/.config/hadolint.yaml:ro" \
  hadolint/hadolint:v2.12.0 < Dockerfile

# supply-chain posture gate
docker run --rm \
  -e GITHUB_AUTH_TOKEN="${GITHUB_TOKEN}" \
  gcr.io/openssf/scorecard:stable \
  --repo="github.com/ReliablyObserve/Loki-VL-proxy" \
  --format json \
  --show-details > scorecard.json
python3 scripts/ci/check_scorecard.py scorecard.json \
  --min-overall 5.0 \
  --require-check Dangerous-Workflow=10 \
  --require-check Binary-Artifacts=10 \
  --require-check CI-Tests=8 \
  --require-check SAST=7

# repo-specific runtime checks
./scripts/ci/run_security_regressions.sh
./scripts/ci/run_zap_scan.sh baseline
./scripts/ci/run_nuclei_scan.sh

When reproducing ZAP locally, expect occasional 10049 Non-Storable Content warnings on deliberate 404 discovery paths such as / or disabled /debug/* endpoints. Those reports are useful for visibility but are not currently treated as exploitable proxy issues.